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Residential Swimming Pools and
"Attractive Nuisance" in California
By JOHN A. GORFINKEL*
THE residential or "backyard" swimming pool is now a commonplace
in California suburbia. What is the liability of the owner or possessor of
the premises with respect to a trespassing child who drowns or is injured
in such a pool? This problem, a special aspect of the broader area of
the so-called "attractive nuisance doctrine,"' has been the subject of
considerable litigation in California in recent years,2 culminating in
the decision of the supreme court in King v. Lennen3 on December
31, 1959.
King v. Lennen sets a new course for the California courts. In
order to understand the significance of that decision and to chart the
probable course of future decisions, it is necessary first to review the
origins of the attractive nuisance doctrine and second to trace the
development of the doctrine in California. In so doing, the principal
area of attention will be the limited one of the applicability, in Cali-
fornia, of attractive nuisance to pools, watercourses and other bodies
of water; cases involving other hazards will be considered only to the
extent they shed light on the principal subject.
Attractive Nuisance-Origins and Development
It was a fundamental principle of the common law that, unless
there was some special circumstance or condition, the owner or pos-
sessor of land owed no duty to a trespasser to maintain his property
in a safe condition.4 The trespasser took the property as he found it
and if he was injured as a result of unsafe conditions, whether natural or
* A.B. 1926, J.D. 1929, J.S.D. 1931, University of California; Dean, Golden Gate
College of Law.
1 See HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.5 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 438-45 (1955);
Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1959).
2 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1957); Wilford v.
Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App. 2d
114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956).
3 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959).
4 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 333 (1934); PROSSER, TORTS 432 (2d ed. 1955);
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.3 (1956). This is to be compared with the liability of the
owner who deliberately set traps or pitfalls to catch trespassers. See Bird v. Holbrook,
4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828); PROSSER, TORTS 94 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 84 (1934).
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man made, that was his misfortune. The one special circumstance here
relevant was the duty owed by the possessor to trespassing children.
In 1873, in the case of Sioux City and Pacific Railroad v. Stout,8 a
railroad was held liable for injuries received by trespassing children
while playing on a turntable on defendant's premises. As formulated
in that case and developed through later decisions,6 the elements of
the doctrine were:
(i) the condition creating the harm had to be an artificial one,
created, constructed or maintained 7 by the possessor of the land;
(ii) the injured person had to be a child s of "tender years"; 9
(iii) the child, for some reason, was excused or excluded from the
disabilities imposed by law on adult trespassers;
(iv) the risk which caused the harm to the child was one which
was not obvious or apparent to the child; and
(v) reasonable precautions were available to minimize or elimi-
nate the risk without impairing the utility of the condition and the
possessor had failed to take such precautions.
This doctrine, sometimes called the "turntable doctrine" from the
mechanical contrivance that gave rise to it, soon acquired the name of
"attractive nuisance." It has been suggested, as the origin of the latter
term: "'Nuisance' because of a supposed analogy to conditions dan-
gerous to children in the highway or otherwise outside of the premises;
'attractive' because it was thought essential that the child be allured
onto the premises." 10 Although the condition causing the injury need
not be, and often is not, a nuisance, and although the entry of the child
on the premises need not be, and often is not, due to the lure or at-
traction of the condition that caused the harm, the term "attractive
nuisance" has persisted. Although that term has been the subject of
much justified criticism, it has acquired a familiarity, through common
usage by courts and lawyers; with full recognition of its inadequacies
and the errors implicit in it, it will be used in this article as a con-
5 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
6 The cases are collected in PRossER, TORTS 438 (2d ed. 1955); HAPER & JAmEs,
ToRTs § 27.5 (1956).
7 On "maintained" see Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CAL. L. REv. 427, 447-448
(1959).
8 There has been an interesting extension, by analogy, to trespassing cattle. Liability
has been imposed on railroads which have left hay, salt, or molasses on the right of way
and attracted cattle to their doom. See Crafton v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R., 55 Mo.
580 (1874). The cattle cases are collected in 41 AwESmcAN DIGEST, CENTxmY EDrION
Railroads § 1404.
9 The matter of the age of the child is discussed infra in text of article.
10 PnossER, TORTS 439 n.21 (2d ed. 1955).
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venient, shorthand method of identifying the principle and the prob-
lem under consideration.
The reception accorded the attractive nuisance doctrine by the
courts of the several states has varied.11 Some accepted it whole-
heartedly, others grudgingly and within narrow limitations, and a few
totally rejected it. It is part of the common law of California, but the
application of the doctrine has been erratic and, at times, confusing.
Controversial Elements of the Doctrine
In its application, three elements of the doctrine have been the
subject of controversy: the nature of the condition as artificial, the
age of the child, and the role the condition or device must play as a
"lure," enticing the child into the initial act of trespass or into the zone
of danger.
Artificial Conditions
All the cases hold and the authorities concede that the doctrine has
no application to natural conditions on the possessor's land and that
the possessor is under no duty to rectify or take precautions with re-
spect to such conditions. -1 2 The condition or contrivance causing the
harm must be an artificial one, created or maintained on the property.
One of the greatest problem areas has been where the condition, al-
though an artificial one, simulates or is comparable to a natural hazard.
The courts have been uncertain in dealing with this situation. This is
one of the principal sources of difficulty and confusion in the California
cases and is fully considered later in this article.
Age of the Child
The attractive nuisance doctrine applies only to a child who, be-
cause of immaturity, either does not discover the dangerous condition
or does not appreciate the risks involved in meddling with it. There
is a consensus among the courts that no arbitrary age limit can be
fixed, above which the doctrine is no longer applicable.' Rather it
is a question of fact in each case whether, with respect to the partic-
ular hazard, the child was too young to appreciate the risk involved.
14
11 See cases collected in PROSSER, TORTS 439 (2d ed. 1955); HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 27.5 at 1448 (1956).
12 But cf. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 427, 446 (1959).
13 PROSSER, TORTS 443-44 (2d ed. 1955); HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.5 at 1453
(1956). Cases in the 13-16 age group are collected in Hoff v. National Refining Prod-
ucts, 38 N.J. Super. 222, 118 A.2d 714 (1955); see also Prosser, Trespassing Children,
47 CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1959).
14 See particularly cases cited Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 427,
444 nn.73-77 (1959). There is one special statute in Califorftia, section 24400 of the
Health and Safety Code, which imposes an age limit of twelve years. That section pro-
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The Condition or Contrivance as a "Lure"
The role that the harm causing condition must play in luring or
enticing the child on to the premises has long been a subject of dispute.
Some of the early cases stressed the requirement that the injury pro-
ducing contrivance or condition had to lure or entice the child into
committing the initial act of trespass which brought him on to the
defendant's lahd.:5 The common law rule that the possessor owed no
duty to the trespasser was avoided by indulging in the fiction that the
device "attracted" or "invited" the child on to the premises, excused
his entry and changed his status from that of trespasser to something
more akin to an invitee. 16 If, however, the child were already a tres-
passer before he discovered the device or condition, the attractive
nuisance doctrine was held inapplicable, since then the trespass could
vides, in part, that "Every person owning land in fee simple or in possession thereof under
lease or contract of sale who knowingly permits the existence on the premises of any
abandoned mining shaft, pit, . . . or other abandoned excavation dangerous to persons
legally on the premises, or to minors under the age of twelve years, who fails to cover or
fence securely any such dangerous abandoned excavation.. . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
The quoted provision was enacted by Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 136, § 1, p. 366. An
earlier act was limited to "abandoned mineshafts, pits or other abandoned excavations
dangerous to passers-by or live stock." Cal. Stat. 1903, ch. 232, §§ 1-2, p. 283. Both the
present section and its predecessor have received little construction. The 1903 act was
construed as protecting only the passers-by on the highway who inadvertently strayed
from the road; trespassers, whether child or adult, were not within its scope; see Flick v.
Ducey & Attwood Rock Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 70, 160 P.2d 569 (1945). The courts have
never clearly decided whether section 24400 permits only a criminal prosecution, or
whether it also gives rise to a civil action for injuries resulting from its violation. Two
cases have assumed that it would give rise to a civil action, Schaffer v. Claremont Country
Club, 168 Cal. App. 2d 351, 336 P.2d 254, 337 P.2d 139 (1959) but holding the section
inapplicable since the excavation had not been abandoned, and Ward v. Oakley Co., 125
Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954) holding that the purported cause of action under
section 24400 was barred by the statute of limitations. Ward v. Oakley is, however, sig-
nificant in its ruling that an action under section 24400 is distinct from an action based
on common law attractive nuisance, and that where the original complaint pleaded only
an attractive nuisance theory, an amendment to the complaint pleading violation of sec-
tion 24400, filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued, was barred by the
one year statute of limitations.
'- See, e.g., Keefe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am- Rep. 393
(1875). Cf. Sioux City v. Stout, supra note 5, which did not stress the role of the turn-
table as the initial lure.
16 "To treat the plaintiff as a voluntary trespasser is to ignore the averments of the
complaint, that the turntable, which was situate in a public (by which we understood an
open, frequented) place, was, when left unfastened, very attractive, and, when put in
motion by them, was dangerous to young children, by whom it could be easily put in
motion, and many of whom were in the habit of going upon it to play. The turntable,
being thus attractive, presented to the natural instincts of young children a strong tempta-
tion; and such children, following, as they must be expected to follow, those natural
instincts, were thus allured into a danger whose nature and extent they, being without
judgment or discretion, could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and against which they
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not be excused or justified. The high water mark of insistence on the
lure factor was the case of United Zinc v. Britt 7 where trespassing chil-
dren were killed in a pool in the basement of defendant's abandoned
plant. The pool, although giving the appearance of clear water, had
been poisoned with acid. It was not visible from any public way or
area. Recovery was denied, the court stating in part "there is no evi-
dence that it [the pool] was what led them to enter the land . ..
[and] that is necessary to start the supposed duty."18 A more pictur-
esque phrasing of this lure concept was that the condition or contri-
vance must attract the child "as a bait attracts a fish or a piece of
stinking meat draws a dog."'19
Most of the American courts have abandoned insistence on the
condition of luring the child into the initial trespass and substituted
for it the requirement that the circumstances be such that the possessor
of the property knew or should reasonably have foreseen that the area
on which the condition existed was one where children were likely
to intrude.20 The lure of the condition may still have a role in that
an enticing device, readily visible from a public way, is a predicate
for a finding that the possessor should foresee that children are likely
to trespass, but if the circumstances are such that children are known
frequently to intrude in the area or are likely so to intrude, then the
fact that the harm causing condition is not visible until after the entry
will not absolve the possessor from liability.
could not protect themselves. The difference between plaintiff's position and that of a
voluntary trespasser, capable of using care, consists in this, that the plaintiff was induced
to come upon the defendant's turntable by the defendant's own conduct, and that, as to
him, the turntable was a hidden danger, a trap . . . .Now, what an express invitation
would be to an adult, the temptation of an attractive plaything is to a child of tender
years." Keefe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 21 Minn. 207, 210-211 (1875).
IT 258 U.S. 268 (1921). This was a diversity case, and was decided as a matter
of general common law under the then prevailing rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) federal courts
in diversity cases must follow the common law rules of the state wherein they sit and
United Zinc v. Britt has applicability only in the District of Columbia and other areas
where federal, rather than state law, governs the rights of the parties. In two cases,
arising in the District of Columbia, the United Zinc case has been distinguished and
explained away. In Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934) a child had been
injured when he was playing on a wharf and fell as a result of a defect. In reversing
a nonsuit granted on the basis that there was no showing that the child was injured by
the condition that induced his intrusion, the Supreme Court said that the wharf was
"a likely place for children to play" and the defendant "had reason to anticipate that
use." United Zinc was explained on the ground that the defendant there had no duty to
anticipate the presence of children trespassing on the property. Eastburn v. Levin, 113
F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1940) is to the same effect.
18 Id. at 276.
19 1 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE 305 (ist ed. 1886).
20 PROSSER, TORTS 440 & nn.32-33 (2d ed. 1955); HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.5
at 1450 (1956).
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The California Cases from 1891 to 1949
And the "Natural Hazards" Exception
California adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine in 1891 when
Barrett v. Southern Pacific Co. 21 applied it to the classical instance of
a railroad turntable. The basis stated for the holding was :22
If defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated that leaving
this turntable unguarded and exposed, an injury such as plaintiff
suffered was likely to occur, then it must be held to have anticipated
it, and was guilty of negligence in thus maintaining it in its exposed
position. It is no answer to this to say that the child was a trespasser,
and if it had not intermeddled with defendant's property it would
not have been hurt, and that the law imposes no duty upon the de-
fendant to make its premises a safe playing-ground for children.
In the forum of law, as well as of common sense, a child of imma-
ture years is expected to exercise only such care and self-restraint as
belongs to childhood, and a reasonable man must be presumed to
know this, and required to govern his actions accordingly. It is a
matter of common experience that children of tender years are guided
in their actions by childish instincts, and are lacking in that discretion
which is ordinarily sufficient to enable those of more mature years
to appreciate and avoid danger, and in proportion to this lack of
judgment on their part, the care which must be observed toward them
by others is increased. And it has been held in numerous cases to be
an act of negligence to leave unguarded and exposed to the observa-
tion of little children dangerous and attractive machinery which they
would naturally be tempted to go about or upon, and against the
danger of which action their immature judgment opposes no warning
or defense.
All the California cases subsequent to Barrett v. Southern Pacific
Co. have recognized that attractive nuisance is a part of California
law,23 but the general tenor of the decisions prior to 1958 was to give
the doctrine no more than a grudging acceptance. It was characterized
as a "definitely limited"24 doctrine imposing "an exceptionally harsh
2191 Cal. 296, 27 Pac. 666 (1891).
22 Id. at 302-03, 27 Pac. at 667.
2s None of the cases hereafter considered has denied the existence of the doctrine; in
every case in which the court held for the defendant, the attractive nuisance doctrine was
accepted as part of California law, but said to be inapplicable under the circumstances.
24 Camp v. Peel, 33 Cal. App. 2d 612, 613, 92 P.2d 428, 429 (1939). See also Brown
v. Reliable Iron Foundry, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 294, 344 P.2d 63 (1959) decided less
than three months before King v. Lennen: "It is the generally accepted rule to restrict and
limit, rather than extend, the doctrine of 'attractive nuisance."'
In Knight v. Kaiser Co., 48 Cal. 2d 778, 312 P.2d 1089 (1957), holding that a sand
pile did not constitute an attractive nuisance, the court stated the "generally accepted
rule . .. [is] to restrict and limit, rather than to extend, the doctrine of 'attractive nui-
sance.' It is a doctrine to be applied cautiously .. "
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rule of liability." 25  In the main, the decisions were consistent with
this cautious and limited approach.
In 1896, in Peters v. Bowman26 the California Supreme Court im-
posed a major limitation on the application of the doctrine. Peters
involved the death of an eleven year old boy who drowned in a pond
on defendant's vacant lot in San Francisco. A judgment for defendant
was affirmed. The argument of plaintiff that recovery should be al-
lowed under the rule of the "turntable cases" was rejected, 27 and the
rule stated that hazards which duplicate or simulate natural hazards
were outside the attractive nuisance doctrine, as a matter of law. The
court therein stated :28
A turntable is not only a danger specially created by the act of the
owner, but it is a danger of a different kind to those which exist in
the order of nature. A pond, although artificially created, is in nowise
different from those natural ponds and streams which exist every-
where, and which involve the same dangers and present the same
appearance and the same attractions to children .... The owner of
a thing dangerous and attractive to children is not always and uni-
versally liable for an injury to a child tempted by the attraction. His
liability bears a relation to the character of the thing, whether natural
and common, or artificial and uncommon, to the comparative ease or
difficulty of preventing the danger without destroying or impairing
the usefulness of the thing, and, in short, to the reasonableness and
propriety of his own conduct, in view of all surrounding circum-
stances and conditions. As to common dangers existing in the order
of nature, it is the duty of parents to guard and warn their children,
and, failing to do so, they should not expect to hold others respon-
sible for their own want of care.
Peters v. Bowman was followed in Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery
Ass'n, 2 9 involving the death of an eight year old boy who drowned in
a reservoir, in a cemetery in a residential area. The complaint alleged
that, while no longer used for burial, the cemetery was maintained as
a "place of adornment and attraction . . . open to the public daily."
25 Whalen v. Streshley, 205 Cal. 78, 81, 269 Pac. 928, 929, 60 A.L.R. 445 (1928);
Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 355, 47 Pac 598, 599 (1896). See also Lake v. Ferrer,
139 Cal. App. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956) where the court quotes, with obvious ap-
proval, disparaging comments on attractive nuisance from the defendant's brief.
26 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 598 (1896).
27 Id. On its facts, Peters v. Bowman may well have been correct in holding for
defendant, since the pond had not been created or maintained by defendant but resulted
from the act of the city in erecting an embankment which prevented the normal drainage
of surface water from defendant's property. But the Peters decision did not rest on this
point. See the reference to this argument in Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 37
Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918).
28 Id. at 355-56, 47 Pac. at 599.
2937 Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918).
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The reservoir, sixteen feet deep, was maintained "immediately along-
side" one of the main driveways. The trial court sustained defendant's
demurrer and the appellate court affirmed, stating:30
A pond of water ... is always attractive to youngsters; but the
dangers connected with and inherent in a lake or pond of water,
natural or artificial, are obvious to everybody-even to a child old
enough to be permitted by its parents to go about and play unat-
tended upon the streets or in the public parks. It would not conform
to the dictates of common reason to say that a child of the age of
eight years, or even much younger, does not know and fully realize
that a fall into a pond of water or a deep reservoir would result in
injury to him if not in his death.... A pond of water, whether natural
or artificial, is not to be included in the same class with turntables and
other complicated machinery, the inherent dangers of which are not
obvious to a child.
In Doyle v. Pacific Electric Co.,3 the "natural hazards" doctrine
was applied when the plaintiff fell from a catwalk through a sky light
and the danger of falling was said to be a common risk, obvious to
all and therefore within the principle of Peters v. Bowman.
32
Until overruled by King in 1959, Peters v. Bowman was consist-
ently followed in principle in all cases involving death or injury in
artificial bodies of water and the natural hazards exception was ex-
tended to death or injury from falling from contrivances such as a
scaffolding which was said to duplicate the natural hazard of falling
while climbing a cliff or a tree.
The "Trap" Exception to the "Natural Hazards" Exception
In Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co.,33 plaintiff re-
covered for the death of an eleven year old boy who was playing in
an abandoned mine tunnel and fell into an open and unprotected stope.
Peters v. Bowman was held inapplicable. The stope in the dark tunnel
was characterized as a "concealed danger" and a "trap" while the
pond in Peters was described as open and obvious. Faylor placed
considerable reliance on Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n,34 the
court stating: "In Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n, supra, the rule
30 Id. at 634, 174 Pac. at 418.
3' 6 Cal. 2d 550, 59 P.2d 93 (1936).
32 Peters v. Bowman had anticipated this situation: "Are we to hold that every
owner of a pond or reservoir is liable in damages for any child that comes uninvited
upon his premises and happens to fall in the water and drown? If so, then upon the
same principle must the owner of a fruit tree be held liable for the death or injury of a
child who, attracted by the fruit, climbs into the branches and falls out? But this, we
imagine, is an absurdity, for which no one would contend. 115 Cal. at 356, 47
Pac. at 599.
33 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919).
3437 Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918).
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of the turntable cases was applied to a reservoir of water in which a
child was drowned, apparently because the reservoir was so concealed
as to be dangerous to persons passing near it. . "...35 This reliance on
Polk was misplaced and the interpretation incorrect; the court in Polk
had held "the complaint fails to state a cause of action for damages
against the defendant, and . . . therefore, the demurrer thereto was
properly sustained."36 Whether Faylor would have reached the same
result, had the court not misconstrued Polk, is pure conjecture, but it
is curious to find that the case which became a leading case 7 in Cali-
fornia on the subject of "trap" was of such doubtful parentage.
The trap exception was first applied in a drowning case in Sanchez
v. Contra Costa Irrigation Dist.,3 8 the "siphon case," when a boy of
five, while playing near an irrigation canal, fell into the canal, slipped
or was drawn into a siphon that carried the canal under a creek, and
drowned. The water in the canal was muddy and the existence of the
siphon could not be ascertained from the surface. The court character-
ized the siphon as an artificial contrivance, not having a counterpart
in nature, and therefore an "unknown, concealed and unguarded dan-
ger."39 There are two alternative bases for this decision, as an excep-
tion to the doctrine of Peters v. Bowman. One is that the siphon, by
creating an unusual and unanticipated suction, drew the boy into it;
the other is that the unanticipated and unguarded siphon was an ex-
traordinary hazard and recovery would have been allowed even if he
fell, rather than was sucked, into it. Since it could not be determined
whether the boy fell into the hole or was sucked into it,40 and since
the Sanchez opinion did not expressly mention the danger of any suc-
tion, it could be supposed that Sanchez established an exception to
Peters in that while a child would assume the ordinary hazards of
drowning, an apparently shallow pool or watercourse which gave no
indication of the presence of sudden drops, pits or extreme depths,
would qualify as a "trap" or an attractive nuisance.
This theory of the Sanchez case was urged, but rejected, in two
subsequent cases, Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 41 and Melendez v.
3545 Cal. App. 194, 203, 187 Pac. 101, 104 (1919).
3637 Cal. App. 624, 638, 174 Pac. 414, 419 (1918). This error was pointed out
in Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. App. 742, 206 Pac. 498 (1922).
37 Faylor has been cited in support of the "trap doctrine" in Reynolds v. Willson,
51 Cal. 2d 94, 101, 331 P.2d 48, 52-53 (1958); Sanchez v. Contra Costa Irrigation Dist.,
205 Cal. 515, 517, 271 Pac. 1060, 1061 (1928).
38 205 Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928).
39 Id. at 518, 271 Pac. at 1061. Sanchez has been so construed in later decisions;
see, e.g., Melendez v. Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937).
40 The Sanchez opinion is silent on this point.
41 115 Cal. App. 122, 300 Pac. 993 (1931).
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City of Los Angeles.4 2 In Beeson, a ten year old boy drowned while
playing in an open storm drain. The complaint alleged that defendant
maintained this open storm drain and, except at one place, the water
in the drain was not more than a foot deep; that there was a hole or
pit about seven feet deep, six feet wide and eight feet long at a point
near where a concrete conduit entered into the storm drain and the
pit was concealed by debris in the water; that the pit had formed as
a result of irosion and improper maintenance and that defendant knew
of the condition. The appellate court, affirming a judgment for de-
fendant, held that the complaint did not state a cause of action, since
"a pond, excavation, or pool of water is not an attractive nuisance."43
Referring to the claim that the pit was a trap, the court said that it
"was not a contrivance or an appliance created by the act of the owner
of the property. It was caused either by the water falling into the
drainage ditch from the cement drain or by the banks of the ditch
caving in and forming a dam, probably by both."44
The facts in the Melendez case were substantially the same, except
that the decedent was eleven and the location of the storm drain and
pit different. A judgment for defendant on demurrer, was affirmed,
the Beeson case cited with approval, and the existence of holes, pits
and the like in what would appear to be a shallow pond or canal
brought within the "natural hazards" exception by this rationale: " 5
In the former case [Beeson] the court took into consideration the
common knowledge that the perils of water are instinctively known
even by a boy of ten years of age and the further fact that water
running over soil operates against the probability of a continuous
even bed.
It would appear, at this point, that the distinction between these
cases and Sanchez, if we eliminate the possibility of the suction factor,
lay either in the fact that in Sanchez the pit was created by positive
act of the defendant and not by natural causes, or that water running
over concrete, 46 as contrasted with soil, does not create the probability
of an uneven bed.
However, in King v. Simons Brick Co.,47 Melendez and Beeson were
extended and applied to absolve the defendant from liability when the
428 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937).
43 115 Cal. App. 122, 128, 300 Pac. 993, 996 (1931).
44Ibid.
458 Cal. 2d-741, 747, 68 P.2d 971, 974 (1937). There is nothing in the Beeson
opinion about the "fact that water running over soil operates against probability of a
continuous even bed." This reference to Beeson in Melendez is apparently to the state-
ment quoted above, that the pit was due to the action of the water and not to a positive
act of the possessor.
46 The ditch in Sanchez was constructed of concrete.
4752 Cal. App. 2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942).
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drowning occurred in a clay pit which had been excavated by the
defendant and became filled with water after the company ceased
operations. Water covered about four acres with two acres having
a depth of less than two feet and two acres having a depth of twenty-
five feet. The water was opaque, the bottom could not be seen, and a
boy of twelve drowned when he was wading in the shallow portion
and plunged into the deep hole.
This, it is submitted, was carrying Peters, Beeson and Melendez
to an extreme not warranted by either the holdings in those cases or
the reasons expressed in those opinions. The sudden drop off, in
opaque water, was a concealed danger; the pond was stagnant, so
the element of flow of water was absent; the pit had been created by
the operations of the defendant and not by natural processes of ero-
sion. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how this result could be
reconciled with Sanchez unless Sanchez was to rest solely upon the
assumption that the decedent was sucked into the siphon and without
that suction there was no liability. This is an assumption that none of
the cases had ever made.
48
The Drowning Cases from 1949 to 1959
And the Restatement of Torts, Section 339
The publication of the official draft of the American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement of the division of the law of torts relating to negli-
gence was authorized in May, 1934, and appeared in print later that
year. The subject of "attractive nuisance" was covered in section 339.
That section has been characterized as "perhaps its most successful
single achievement," and "a new point of departure for the modem
law."49 It received almost no attention in California from 1934 to
1949.50 Since 1949 it has been the subject of major concern in the
California decisions. Because of its importance in the development
of the current California doctrine, the entire section is quoted:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young
children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial
condition which he maintains thereon, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon
which the possessor knows or should know that such children are
likely to trespass, and
48 The opinion merely states: "He fell into the main canal .. .and then, evidently,
slipped into the syphon .... 205 Cal. at 516, 271 Pac. at 1061.
49 PRossER, TORTS 440 (2d ed. 1955).
50 Melendez v. Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937) seems to be the
only drowning case prior to 1949 which referred to section 339; the court found no in-
consistency between its holding and the Restatement section.
[Vol. 13THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should
know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unrea-
sonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
-(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condi-
tion or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is
slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein.
In considering the relationship between section 339 and the Cali-
fornia cases that follow, two aspects of that section are particularly
significant:
(i) the requirement that the condition constitute a lure is elimi-
nated; the test is whether the possessor knows or may reasonably fore-
see that children will intrude and meddle; and
(ii) the age of the child, the nature of the condition, and the ob-
viousness of the risk are elements to be taken into consideration in
determining the ultimate question, viz., whether the possessor, as a
reasonable man, should foresee the likelihood of intrusion by children
too young to comprehend the risk.
Beginning in 1949, the California courts repeatedly stated that
California law was in accord with section 339 of the Restatement of
Torts, but the tenor of decisions in attractive nuisance cases involving
"natural hazards" was such as to indicate either a misunderstanding
of the implications of section 339 or a misconception of the import of
the prior decisions.51 Thus it should have been clear that the holdings
in Peters v. Bowman, Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n, Beeson v. Los
Angeles, Melendez v. Los Angeles and King v. Simons Brick Co.-that
the hazards in those cases were not attractive nuisances, as a matter
of law-were inconsistent with the principle stated in section 339. It
was not until the decision in King v. Lennen in 1959 that the incon-
sistency was acknowledged.
The first drowning case in California to place major reliance on
section 339 was Long v. Standard Oil Co.5 2 The facts of the case
were such that it is doubtful if it should have been decided on the
attractive nuisance doctrine. The defendant had dug a pit eight feet
deep on private property to reach its underground pipe lane and repair
a leak.5 3 After making the repairs, defendant permitted the excava-
5'Thus, Spence, J., dissenting in Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 117, 338 P.2d
433, 439 (1959): "The existing chaos will only be perpetuated by continuing to quote
section 339 of the Restatement of Torts without adequately discussing its relation to the
'former cases.' "
5292 Cal. App. 2d 455, 207 P.2d 837 (1949).
53 It does not appear from the- decision whether the defendant was the owner or
possessor of the land or merely had an easement across it for pipe line purposes. If the
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tion to remain. Water, oil seepage and debris accumulated filling it
to within two or three feet of the surface of the adjoining land which
was uneven and covered with weeds and grass. One entire side of the
excavation and part of a second were completely unprotected; the
remaining sides were partly protected by a rope, attached to posts,
but the rope sagged in places to within one foot of the surface. The
excavation was within ten feet of a public way, in an area between
two large housing projects and there was evidence that adults and
children living in the two projects frequently traversed the area. A
boy, aged three years and ten months, fell into the excavation and was
drowned. The defendant was held liable. It is difficult to conceive of
a more dangerous condition and one which, once the predicate of
constant intrusion by trespassers was established, would have subjected
the possessor to liability for injury to trespassing adults as well as
children. 54 There can be no doubt of the correctness of the result.
The significance of the Long decision is not in its holding, but in its
assertion that section 339 of the Restatement was established law in
California, and the effect given that assertion in later cases.
Between 1949 and 1956, four significant cases were decided; two
involved drownings and two did not. In the non-drowning cases of
defendant had only an easement, its subsequent conduct in not restoring the surface
would have rendered it liable to a trespasser, regardless of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine. See Langazo v. San Joaquin L. & P. Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678, 90 P.2d 825
(1939); Yee Chuck v. Stanford University, 179 Cal. App. 2d 405, 3 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1960); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §381 (1934).
54 Such a case would be within the principle of section 355 of the Restatement of
'rorts. See Malloy v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society, 78 Cal. XIX, 3 Cal. Unrep. 76,
21 Pac. 525 (1889). In that case a boy of nearly four fell into a cesspool dug by the
defendant within ten feet of a public street. The pit was ten feet deep and about nine
feet by six feet in area. It had become filled with debris and was without safeguard,
fence or covering. Recovery was allowed. In Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 217-18,
65 Pac. 379, 380 (1901), referring to the Malloy case, the supreme court said: "It is true
that damages were there sought for the death of an infant occasioned by falling into a
cesspool; but the complaint would have been sufficient to have warranted a recovery had
an adult been killed under the same circumstances; for the complaint showed a veritable
trap,-a cesspool open and unguarded, yet with its surface covered with a layer of de-
ceptive earth to a level with the adjacent land. Into such a trap any one, adult or child
might have walked." See also Blaylock v. Jensen, 44 Cal. App. 2d 850, 851-52, 113
P.2d 256, 257 (1941) where a thirteen year old girl was caught in an oil sump twenty
to thirty feet from a public way while endeavoring to rescue a dog, and the court stated:
"Defendant argues that the sump was not an 'attractive nuisance,' and that since plaintiff
was a trespasser defendant was under no obligation to plaintiff to keep the premises in
a safe condition. Although the trial court found that defendant 'knew that it (the sump)
was attractive to children' the liability of defendant need not be predicated upon the
attractive nuisance doctrine. The conclusion of the trial court may be sustained under
the general rule that a landowner may not construct or maintain a trap or pitfall into
which he knows or has reason to believe that a trespasser will probably fall."
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
Aug., 1961] ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
Marino v. Valenti55 and Copfer v. Golden,56 the California law was
said to be substantially as stated in section 339 of the Restatement,
and Long v. Standard Oil Co. cited to that effect.5 In Marino one
child had been killed and several injured by the explosion of dynamite
caps which the children had found in an abandoned shack near a
public way; the attractive nuisance doctrine was held applicable. In
Copfer recovery was allowed when a child was injured in a fall from
a mechanical contrivance on property maintained as a junk yard. In
the two drowning cases, Betts v. San Francisco58 and Ward v. Oakley
Co.,59 recovery was denied. In neither case did the court mention
Restatement section 339. The facts of the Betts case were such that
under section 339 recovery was doubtful, in view of the precautions
taken by the defendant to safeguard the premises.60 However, Ward
v. Oakley Co. was a clear case for liability on the facts pleaded, if
section 339 was the law in California. The complaint in Ward alleged
that defendant's mining operations had created a peculiar and artificial
soil condition which resulted in two children being "dragged and
sucked under" while wading in what was apparently a shallow slough
on defendant's property" The trial court sustained defendant's de-
murrer without leave to amend and the appellate court affirmed on the
authority of Peters v. Bowman and its successors. The Sanchez case was
explained as involving a "hidden or concealed trap" 62 and Beeson,
Melendez and King v. Simons Brick Co. were cited as supporting the
judgment of the court0 3 It is difficult to understand why section 339
was ignored, or how the condition, as alleged in Ward, was any less
dangerous, any less artificial, or any less concealed than in Sanchez.
Two drowning cases decided in 1956 clearly indicated that the
California law was in a chaotic state.
In Lake v. Ferrer,"4 a child of two and one-half years drowned in
a swimming pool on defendant's property. The complaint pleaded all
the elements of a cause of action under Restatement section 339, but
the trial court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint. The
district court of appeals affirmed, holding, in accordance with Peters
v. Bowman, that a pool of water could not be an attractive nuisance,
55 118 Cal. App. 2d 830, 259 P.2d 84 (1953).
56 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 288 P.2d 90 (1955).
5 7 Supra nn.55, 56.
58 108 Cal. App. 2d 701, 239 P.2d 456 (1952).
59 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954).
60 See 108 Cal. App. 2d at 702, 239 P.2d at 457.
81 Summarizing the allegations of the complaint, 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 843, 271
P.2d 536, 538-39 (1954).
62 125 Cal. App. 2d at 845, 271 P.2d at 540.
63 Id. at 846-49, 271 P.2 at 540-42.
64 139 Cal. App. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956).
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as a matter of law. The court's opinion was largely a quoting of re-
spondent's brief, but with apparent approval of such statements as
"no matter how young a child may be, its age will not cast its care
upon a stranger" and the attractive nuisance doctrine is definitely
limited and "exceptionally harsh rule of liability . . . not to be ex-
tended."65 Restatement section 339 was not referred to. The decision
in Lake v. Ferrer was filed on February 8, 1956.
On February 16, 1956, the United States district court for the
northern district of California, in Anderson v. United States,60 reached
the opposite result in a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.67
Section 339 of the Restatement was said to be the law of California,
the court citing Long v. Standard Oil Co. and Copfer v. Golden. Ward
v. Oakley was ignored; Lake v. Ferrer had not yet appeared in print.
In Anderson, a three year old boy had drowned in a concrete canal
maintained by an agency of the United States. There were no peculiar
mechanical contrivances such as the siphon in Sanchez, and there was
nothing comparable to the bidden dangers in Long. The facts were
such that it was a clear case for liability if section 339 were the law in
California; 68 it was a clear case for non-liability if, as Ward v. Oakley
and Lake v. Ferrer had held, Peters v. Bowman was still the law in
California.
In 1957 the "natural hazards" exception was applied in Knight v.
Kaiser Co.69 when a child of ten, playing in a sand pile on defendant's
property, was killed when the pile collapsed and smothered him. The
supreme court affirmed the action of the trial court in sustaining a
general demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and held that attractive nui-
sance did not apply, as a matter of law:
70
As far as attractiveness to children is concerned there is no signif-
icant difference between a body of water and a sand pile. Pools of
water and sand piles duplicate the work of nature and are not uncom-
mon. In fact a pool of water is far more dangerous. The dangers
connected with and inherent in a sand pile are obvious to everyone,
6 Id. at 117, 293 P.2d at 106.
66 138 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
67 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1952).
68 Defendant maintained a canal with steep sloping sides, the top of which was sev-
eral feet above ground level. Although the area had been fenced at one time, the fence
was in disrepair. Defendant had notice of frequent trespassing in the area and of the hazard
created by the canal. There had been several drownings of children within recent years.
A child wandered up the embankment, fell into the canal and drowned. There was noth-
ing to show that the canal or the water in it was any different from an ordinary stream
or water course. As of Jan. 1, 1961, Anderson had not been cited or discussed by any
California case.
r9 48 Cal 2d 778, 312 P.2d 1089 (1957).
70 Id. at 782, 312 P.2d at 1091-92.
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even to a child old enough to be permitted by its parents to play
unattended.
Section 339 of the Restatement was held inapplicable since the
risk involved was said to have been one which should have been ap-
parent to and appreciated by children. Lake v. Ferrer was cited with
approval.
In Lopez v. Capital Co.,71 the natural hazard doctrine was applied
when a boy of seven fell from a metal scaffold on the front of a building
undergoing repairs. The scaffold was described as similar to the "mon-
key bars" in playgrounds and was readily accessible to the street. Al-
though the complaint indicated that the scaffold was planked with
"loose, wobbly and insecure boards," defendant's demurrer was sus-
tained and the judgment of dismissal affirmed on appeal.72
Between Lake v. Ferrer and King v. Lennen four more drowning
cases were decided, two for defendant and two for plaintiff. Wilford
v. Little 73 affirmed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer to a com-
plaint which alleged the drowning of a four and one-half year old boy
in a swimming pool on defendant's property. A special lure factor was
pleaded in the presence of a diving board which allegedly had attracted
the child as similar to a see-saw and from which he fell into the pool.
In Van Winkle v. City of King,t4 recovery was denied when the de-
ceased, who was two years and ten months old,. drowned in a pool in
defendant's sewage disposal plant. In both cases Peters v. Bowman
and its progeny were invoked; attractive nuisance, with the one ex-
ception of the hidden trap type of case, was said to be inapplicable
71 141 Cal. App. 2d 60, 296 P.2d 63 (1956).
72 It may be that the result in Lopez is due to the wording of the complaint which
apparently alleged that plaintiff fell from the scaffold and not that he fell or slipped
because of the 'loose, wobbly and insecure boards." Query, if the boards had slipped,
would Lopez have been decided for plaintiff on the "trap" theory? In this respect, cf.
Helguera v. Cirone, 178 Cal. App. 2d 232, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1960) also a scaffold case,
overruling Lopez v. Capital Co., and distinguishing between the obvious risk of a fall
from a scaffold and the not so obvious risk, if the fall is caused by a defect in the scaf-
fold, with Brown v. Reliable Iron Foundry, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 294, 344 P.2d 633
(1959) in which Lopez was cited for the proposition that "attractive nuisance [was]
inapplicable as a matter of law." See also Doyle v. Pacific R.R. Co., 6 Cal. 2d 500, 59
P.2d 93 (1936) and Severance v. Rose, 151 Cal. App. 2d 500, 311 P.2d 866 (1957). In
the Doyle case a boy nearly fourteen was seated as a spectator, in the balcony of the audi-
torium. He climbed a ladder fastened against the wall through an opening in the ceiling,
traversed the attic over planks laid on the joists to a canvas covered skylight, stepped on
to the canvas and fell through the skylight to the main floor twenty feet below. Judgment
for the defendant seems correct on the basis that it could hardly be expected to anticipate
the presence of intruders into the area of risk. In Severance, the decision can be supported
on the grounds that the hazard was obvious to a child of ten.
73144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956).
74 149 Cal. App. 2d 500, 308 P.2d 512 (1957).
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to bodies of water, regardless of the age of the child. Presumably if
the child were old enough to escape the surveillance of parents or
guardians and find his way to the pool, he was old enough, as a matter
of law, to comprehend the danger.
In Reynolds v. Willson,75 recovery was allowed under special cir-
cumstances. In this case a child of two years and three months
sustained serious injuries when he nearly drowned in defendant's
swimming pool. The pool was the typical residential swimming pool,
shallow at one end and deep at the other, with an abrupt drop from
the shallow to the deep end. The pool had been partially drained for
the winter, leaving just enough water in it to cover the bottom at the
shallow end. Decomposed leaves and dirt accumulated in the pool and
algae formed on the concrete surface beneath the water, making the
floor of the pool slippery. Apparently the child had fallen or slipped
into the deep end but was found in time for artificial respiration. The
appeal was from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Plaintiff advanced three theories to sup-
port the verdict, (i) attractive nuisance under section 339 of the Re-
statement, (ii) trap and (iii) status as an invitee.
The court conceded that the facts met the test of section 339 and
stated that the course of prior decisions was consistent with section 339.
Peters v. Bowman and its progeny were said to be consistent with
section 339, but some rather tenuous distinctions were made.76 Lake
v. Ferrer and Wilford v. Little were cited with approval, and as sup-
porting the statement, "It is established in this state that a private
swimming pool is not an attractive nuisance as a matter of law."
7
7
75 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1958).
76 Id. at 103-06, 331 P.2d at 54-55. "In Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Assn.... it was
held that no dangerous condition existed in the maintenance of the reservoir; that if any
dangers existed they were ... apparent to a child of the decedent's years." "In Brown v.
City of Los Angeles . . . the facts do not show that any unusual hazard was present in
the pool." "In ... Betts v. City and County of San Francisco . . . it was held that the
[moss-covered] spillway was an obvious hazard visible to anyone. . . . "In Ward v.
Oakley Co. . . . the peculiar characteristic of the mud was that of a natural rather than
an artificial condition." No real attempt was made to distinguish or explain Melendez
v. City of Los Angeles or King v. Simons Brick Co. Cf. dissenting opinion of Spence, J.,
51 Cal. 2d 94, 107, 331 P.2d 48, 56: "[The majority] opinion purports to distinguish,
rather than to disapprove, the prior decisions in which liability has been denied, but I
am of the opinion that no tenable distinction can be made. In other words, the majority
opinion here cannot be reconciled with the prior decisions, and the labored but futile
attempt of the majority opinion to bring them into harmony has the unfortunate result
of leaving the law in hopeless confusion."
77 Id. at 100, 331 P.2d at 52. The quoted sentence is itself ambiguous and is sus-
ceptible to two interpretations. It may mean, "It is established in this state, as a matter
of law, that a private swimming pool may not be an attractive nuisance," or it may mean,
"It is established in this state that whether a private swimming pool is an attractive
nuisance is a matter of fact for the jury and not a matter of law for the court."
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The court then considered the manner of the maintenance of the
pool as a trap and agreed that the verdict was also supportable on
this theory.78
Reynolds may well have been the high point of misunderstanding
the relation of section 339 to pools and other "natural hazards." It
asserted that section 339 was the law in California and applicable to
the hazard of a slippery swimming pool, that "trap" was something
distinct from liability under section 339, and then proceeded by its
review of the cases to demonstrate that in no drowning case had lia-
bility been found, unless the hazard was a trap.
Schaffer v. Claremont Country Club80 presented a peculiar situa-
tion in that while death resulted from drowning, liability was predi-
cated on the condition of the adjacent land and not on the condition
or maintenance of the body of water. The property had previously
been a quarry; after being abandoned as a quarry, it was kept by de-
fendant as a reservoir.8' The sides of the excavation sloped and the
rock was crumbly. The decedent, aged eight, was climbing on the
slope when the rock gave way, precipitating him into the water.
The treacherous nature of the slope was regarded as an unusual
and concealed danger, comparable to a trap, although why it was less
obvious or more hazardous to a boy of eight than the spillway in
Betts was to a boy of seven is not apparent, and although previouscases had indicated that the risk of falling, unless there was a hidden
pit or trap, was within the "natural hazards" exception.
Section 339 was said to be the law in California,8 2 but with over-
tones of the trap theory.
One other "natural hazard" case needs special mention. In Courtell
v. McEachen, 3 a hazard from fire was held to be within attractive
nuisance, in reliance on section 339, where the evidence indicated that
the fire was smoldering, without flame, as a result of the earlier burning
of some debris, and thus gave no indication of its existence.
In addition to the drowning, scaffold and fire cases, several other
decisions rendered after Lake v. Ferrer asserted that California law
78Id. citing with approval Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co., supra
note 33, Sanchez v. Contra Costa Irrigation Dist., supra note 38, Long v. Standard Oil
Co., supra note 52, and Blaylock v. Jensen, supra note 54.
79d. '
80 168 Cal. App. 2d 351, 336 P.2d 345, 337 P.2d 139 (1959).
81 Plaintiff in this case had urged both attractive nuisance and a statutory duty under
section 24400 of the Health and Safety Code. Section 24400 was held inapplicable since
the excavation, although originally a quarry, -was now being used as a reservoir and
hence was not an "abandoned excavation."
82 Supra note 80.
8351 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
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was consistent with or had adopted the principle of Restatement sec-
tion 339.84
In the main these cases assumed, without too much critical anal-
ysis, that section 339 was consistent with the general course of the
earlier cases, but there was an increasing awareness that all was not
as it seemed. This awareness, which had first clearly manifested itself
in the dissenting opinion in the Reynolds case,8 5 was forcefully ex-
pressed in Garcia v. Soogian.0
In that case a child, aged twelve years and eight months, was in-
jured when she tried to jump over some prefabricated building panels
on defendant's property, fell and was injured. Plaintiff recovered
judgment in the trial court. On appeal, all members of the supreme
court agreed on a reversal of the judgment, but divided on the question
whether the case should be remanded for a new trial or with directions
to enter judgment for defendant. The view of the majority, in support
of remand for a new trial, was that Restatement section 339 was the
law in California and under that section "There is no justification for
regarding the commonness of a condition as having a decisive signif-
icance independent of the obviousness of the risk."87
The minority opinion insisted that there was an irreconcilable in-
consistency between the earlier California cases and either Restate-
ment section 339 or the manner in which it was now being applied. 88
84 Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 338 P.2d 433 (1959); child injured while
playing with building materials; judgment for plaintiff reversed for error in the instruc-
tions. Guiterrez v. Southern Pacific Co., 174 Cal. App. 2d 866, 345 P.2d 326 (1959);
children injured while playing around ice plant adjacent to railroad tracks; held not
within section 339. Brown v. Reliable Iron Foundry, 174 Cal. App. 2d 294, 344 P.2d
633 (1959); child injured while playing in a barrel; order affirmed granting new trial
after verdict for plaintiff. Severance v. Rose, 151 Cal. App. 2d 500, 311 P.2d 866
(1957); child injured on a contrivance in a playground; held for defendant since the
risk was obvious. Woods v. San Francisco, 148 Cal. App. 2d 958, 307 P.2d 698 (1957);
child injured playing around building under construction; judgment for defendant on
demurrer to complaint, reversed. Edler v. Sepulveda Park Apts., 141 Cal. App. 2d 675,
297 P.2d 508 (1956); child injured on a lawn; found not to be a trespasser.
85 Quoted supra note 76.
11 Quoted supra note 51.
87 52 Cal. 2d 107, 111, 338 P.2d 433, 435-36 (1959).
88 It is not clear whether the minority was urging that section 339 was not the
law in California, or whether it was urging that the early cases were entirely con-
sistent with section 339 and the later decisions, particularly Reynolds v. Willson, Copfer
v. Golden, and Courtell v. McEachen, were misconstructions or misapplications of sec-
tion 339 in that in those cases the children were chargeable, as a matter of law, with
realization of the risk involved in meddling with the condition or in coming within the
area made dangerous by it. See, e.g., the reference to Copfer v. Golden, supra note 87
at 116-17, 338 P.2d at 439 as an "erroneous interpretation of section 339."
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King v. Lennen-The Clarification Process
King v. Lennen,8 9 decided by a divided court on December 31,
1959, finally clarified the situation by its recognition that section 339
was the law in California, that under section 339 an ordinary swim-
ming pool could be an attractive nuisance, and that such a holding
was clearly inconsistent with the Peters v. Bowman line of decisions.
The appeal was from a judgment for defendants entered after their
demurrer to plaintiff's complaint had been sustained. The essential
allegations of the complaint were: plaintiff's son, aged one and one-half
years, bad drowned in defendants' swimming pool; the parties lived
diagonally across an intersection from each other; defendants occupied
a corner lot and the pool was located about thirty feet distant from
one street; defendants' property had a concrete wall along that street,
with an opening four feet wide directly opposite the pool and a rail
fence along the other street, with openings through which children
could easily enter; no adults remained at home on defendants' property
on weekdays, and none was at home the day of the drowning; de-
fendants' teen-age daughter often performed baby-sitting chores for
plaintiffs and frequently brought the decedent to play by the pool;
defendants kept a cow, two dogs and three horses on their property,
and these animals were allowed to roam freely on the property and
near the pool; the pool was the usual residential pool, with a depth
of from three and one-half to nine feet; the water was dirty and opaque
and its depth could not be judged by observation; there were no lad-
ders or holds on the sides of the pool. Summarizing the allegations, the
majority opinion commented:"0
The animals and the pool could be seen by children of tender
years who regularly used the streets adjacent to defendants' premises,
and, as defendants knew or should have known, such children, at-
tracted by what they saw, habitually entered the premises and played
with the animals and in and about the pool.
The majority tested the complaint against the requirements of
section 339 thus: 9'
It is specifically alleged that defendants knew or should have
known that children of tender years habitually entered the premises
and played in and about the pool and that defendants knew or
should have known that Boyd [the decedent] had frequently been
brought to the vicinity of the pool by their daughter with the result
that he had become attracted to it. The allegations describing the
condition of defendants' pool and the surrounding premises, includ-
8953 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959).
00 Id. at 342, 348 P.2d at 99, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
91 Id. at 345, 348 P.2d at 100-01, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
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ing the absence of an adequate fence or other safeguards, state facts
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that defendants should have
realized that a serious danger of drowning was presented with respect
to any unsupervised child of Boyd's age who might come to the pool.
Obviously it could be found that a child of one and one-half years
would not understand the risk involved in being near a swimming
pool, and it is alleged that Boyd did not know the danger. The last
of the requirements set forth in section 339 was also sufficiently
covered by the allegations that the utility to defendants of maintain-
ing the condition was slight as compared with the risk to young chil-
dren and that reasonable safeguards could have been provided at
little cost.
For the proposition that section 339 was the law in California, the
majority cited Reynolds v. Willson, Garcia v. Soogian, and Courtell
v. McEachen. Garcia and Courtell were said to sustain the proposition
that a common condition duplicating nature might be an attractive
nuisance under the principles of section 339:92
[In Garcia we held that] . . . the circumstance that a condition
giving rise to injury is common in character does not necessarily ex-
clude liability, that the ability to appreciate danger varies with the
age and mental capacity of the child, and that what is important is
not whether conditions are common in character but whether their
dangers are fully understood by children. In Courtell v. McEachen
• ..we held that a young trespassing child who was injured by a
common condition, namely fire or embers, might recover ... and that
it was for the trier of fact to determine whether the child was injured
by a risk not obvious to her.... [It] seems obvious that the common
nature of a danger, such as that of drowning in a pool, should not
bar relief if the child is too young to realize the danger. Even very
young children cannot always be kept under the supervision of their
parents....
The majority opinion recognized that its decision and reliance on
section 339 were completely inconsistent with most of the decisions
prior to Garcia v. Soogian and Courtell v. McEachen, which the court
stated: 9
3
[Had] ... reasoned that the "attractive nuisance" doctrine does not
apply unless the dangerous condition is uncommon and different from
natural conditions which exist everywhere and that a body of water,
natural or artificial, is a common danger and therefore, as a matter of
law, will not subject the possessor to liability for the drowning of a
trespassing child, even if that child is too young to appreciate the
danger.
Twelve cases94 were specifically disapproved "insofar as their lan-
92 Id. at 344, 348 P.2d at 100, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
93 Ibid.
94 The twelve cases listed were: Knight v. Kaiser, 48 Cal. 2d 778, 312 P.2d 1089
(1957); Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Doyle
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guage or holdings are contrary to the views expressed. . ".."95 The
importance of this disapproval in clarifying the state of the law, is best
manifested by the fact that seven of the twelve cases disapproved by
the King majority had been said, by the majority in Reynolds v. Will-
son to be entirely consistent with Restatement section 339.96
King v. Lennen was followed two months later by Helguera v.
Cirone,97 involving injury to a boy of seven who fell from a scaffold
on a building under construction. The complaint alleged that the scaf-
folding was defective and that it was in an area where conditions con-
stituted "an invitation to minor children" to enter and play. The court
recognized the change in the law effected by King v. Lennen: 8
It appears particularly significant to us that the King case ex-
pressly overruled Knight v. Kaiser . . . which is more analogous to
the instant case than any of the other recent California cases. Thus,
it appears that at the present time, a very liberal view is to be taken
in considering whether the allegations of a complaint sufficiently
satisfy the third and fourth conditions of section 339.
Referring to the scaffold case of Lopez v. Capital Co., the court
recognized that while attractive nuisance had heretofore not been ap-
plied in climbing cases: 99
... rUn view of the recent decisions of our Supreme Court, we are
forced to conclude here that the complaint states a cause of action
against the defendant, and it is left to a jury to determine whether the
facts adduced at the trial satisfy the third and fourth conditions of
section 339 of the Restatement of Torts.
v. Pacific Electric Ry., 6 Cal. 2d 550, 59 P.2d 93 (1936); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal.
345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Van Winkle v. City of King, 149 Cal. App. 2d 500, 308 P.2d
512 (1957); Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lopez v.
Capital Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 60, 296 P.2d 63 (1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App.
2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956); Ward v. Oakley Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536
(1954); King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942); Beeson
v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122, 300 Pac. 993 (1931); Reardon v. Spring
Valley Water Co., 68 Cal. App. 13, 228 Pac. 406 (1924).
95 53 Cal. 2d 340, 345, 348 P.2d 98, 100, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667 (1959). A word of
caution is needed here; it is to be emphasized that the disapproval in King v. Lennen
does not mean that all of the cited cases are overruled or that, in another case identical
in its facts, with one of the twelve, the opposite result would necessarily be reached. For
example, non-recovery in the Doyle case seems warranted on the premise that plaintiff's
presence in the area of the risk was completely unforeseeable.
Peters v. Bowman, Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery
Ass'n, Reardon v. Spring Valley Water Co., Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, King v.
Simons Brick Co., Ward v. Oakley Co., Knight v. Kaiser Co., supra note 94.
97178 Cal. App. 2d 232, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1960).
98 Id. at 237, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
09 Ibid.
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Attractive Nuisance in California-What of the Future?
Assuming that King v. Lennen continues as the accepted doctrine
in California, what does it portend for the future? Several observa-
tions are in order.
The Nature of the Condition as an Issue of Fact and Not of Law
The principal significance of King v. Lennen is that what has here-
tofore been treated largely as a matter of law is now an issue of fact.
From Peters v. Bowman through Lake v. Ferrer and Wilford v. Little,
a pool or pond, as a matter of law, was not an attractive nuisance. With
King v. Lennen, the distinction between artificial conditions simulating
natural conditions and artificial contrivances not having a counterpart
in nature has been abandoned as a matter of law; it still exists as an
issue of fact.100 Here the language of the Restatement is particularly
important. Section 339 provides that the possessor is not liable unless
"the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within
the area made dangerous by it," and absolves the possessor from lia-
bility for injury resulting from "those conditions the existence of which
is obvious even to children and the risk of which is fully realized by
them."
The proper interpretation and application of these qualifications was
the principal source of confusion in those cases, prior to King v. Len-
nen, which had asserted that California law was in accord with the
Restatement, but had said that a pool of water was such an obvious
risk, regardless of the age of the child and regardless also of hidden
depths or holes, that it could not qualify as an attractive nuisance. It
would appear now that a normal swimming pool, pond or water course,
while not an attractive nuisance to a child of ten or twelve, may well
be an attractive nuisance to a child of two or three, if the possessor
has knowledge or should foresee that children of such age may be too
young to appreciate the risk and may intrude on the property. It would
also appear that while a normal pool or water course is an obvious risk
or hazard to a child of twelve, if there are hidden dangers in the form
of sudden drops or pits, masked by surface conditions, it is an attractive
nuisance to a child who, while he may be old enough to appreciate
the normal hazards, is unaware of the hidden dangers. It is here that
the "trap" concept of the Faylor and Sanchez cases is still important.
100 This is not to say that every case in which attractive nuisance is alleged neces-
sarily involves a matter for the trier of the facts. See Joslin v. Southern Pacific Co., 189
Cal. App. 2d -- , 11 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1961) holding that a complaint alleging injury to
a twelve year old boy, who tried to jump on a train moving slowly along a public street,
did not state a cause of action because, as a matter of law, the risk was obvious and
the burden of adequate precautions an impossible one.
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The Concept of a "Trap" in the California Cases
As previously noted, there have been frequent references in the
California cases to the condition or contrivance as an alleged "trap,"
and in every drowning case prior to 1959 which sustained recovery for
plaintiff, the condition was characterized as a "trap." This has led to
some confusion as to whether the trap concept was something apart
from attractive nuisance, was inherent in it or was merely one factor
to be considered in determining whether attractive nuisance applies.101
There are three situations in which a condition of the premises,
that might be described as a trap, should subject a possessor of land
to liability to a trespasser. The first is where the possessor intentionally
creates hazards in the form of pits, spring guns or actual traps to injure
or catch known or anticipated trespassers, whether adult or child. Here
liability for battery is imposed if injury is inflicted that exceeds the
privilege of the possessor.10 2
The second is where the possessor creates or maintains, in a limited
area, a condition dangerous to known trespassers and the danger is
not obvious. Here there is a duty to use reasonable care to provide
safeguards, by warning or otherwise, for such trespassers, and a failure
to exercise such a degree of care will result in liability to either an
adult or child.
The third is where the condition is dangerous to children tres-
passing and meddling because of a characteristic that is not obvious
or apparent to children. In this connection to call the condition a trap
is to say no more than that the hazard was one that would not be
apparent to the intruder. For example, conceding that the hazard of
drowning is obvious to a ten year old child, if death or injury results
not from the natural hazard of drowning but from the fact that the
pool is poisoned with industrial waste, the injury causing condition is
not obvious. The attractive nuisance doctrine is applicable, and calling
the condition a trap is no more than a shorthand labelling technique,
for saying, in the words of section 339, that "the children ... do not
discover the condition or realize the risk involved."103
101 For example, Doyle v. Pacific R.R., 6 Cal. 2d 550, 59 P.2d 93 (1936), seems to
have regarded the "trap" aspect as part of the general "attractive nuisance" doctrine in
that the condition, characterized as a trap, was a danger not obvious or apparent to the
trespassing child. However, both Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co., 45
Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919) and Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d
48 (1958) appear to have treated "trap" as something distinctly different from attrac-
tive nuisance.
102 See supra note 4.
103 On this theory there was no justifiable basis for the distinction between the
Sanchez case and the Melendez, Beeson, Ward and King cases.
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The Lure Problem
Prior to King v. Lennen, California had not clearly settled the
matter of the role of lure or enticement in attractive nuisance cases.
The earlier cases' 04 had stressed the significance of the dangerous
contrivance as a lure, but it was not clear whether the courts had in
mind the strict requirement of the United Zinc case that the contriv-
ance must itself lure the child onto the premises, or whether the courts
were merely holding that the nature of the device was such that it was
foreseeable that children, once on the premises might be attracted to
it.105 Many of the decisions, whether sustaining or denying recovery,
had emphasized that either the contrivance, or something else on the
property, attracted the child to the premises.10 6 For example, in Ma-
rino v. Valenti,07 the dilapidated shack in which the dynamite caps
were found, readily visible to children on the public way, was said to
have been a lure, enticing children to enter and explore. And, without
specifically saying so, the court approached the box of dynamite caps
104 See Giannini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 548, 552, 169 Pac. 80, 82 (1917): "It
is an essential ingredient to a cause of action to which the 'turntable cases' doctrine ap-
plies that the minor should have been attracted to the premises by a childish curiosity
and desire to play thereon." See also Barrett v. Southern Pacific Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27
Pac. 666 (1891).
105 See 35 CAL. JuR. 2d, Negligence, § 156 (1957): "To render the attractive nui-
sance doctrine applicable, the contrivance or machinery involved must be both attractive
and dangerous to children, and the injured child must actually have been attracted to
the premises by childish curiosity and a desire to play thereon." (Emphasis added.)
Does "thereon" mean the premises-or the contrivance? Does the statement import that
the contrivance attract the child? Or merely that "childish curiosity" lead the child onto
the premises? In footnote 20 to the cited text, Betts v. San Francisco, 108 Cal. App. 2d
701, 239 P.2d 456 (1925), is explained as follows: "Liability ... was denied where the
victims were not attracted to the reservoir in which they drowned by a desire to play
therein. . . ." Cf. in this regard Severance v. Rose, 151 Cal. App. 2d 500, 311 P.2d 866
(1957) which emphasizes the importance of the contrivance as a "lure" with Woods v.
San Francisco, 148 Cal. App. 2d 958, 307 P.2d 698 (1957); Elder v. Sepulveda Park
Apts., 141 Cal. App. 2d 675, 297 P.2d 508 (1956), and Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal.
App. 2d 623, 288 P.2d 90 (1955).
106 Taylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App. 194, 203, 187 Pac.
101, 103 (1919) is replete with references to the lure of the tunnel which, like a cave, has
been "since the days of Ali Baba, Robinson Crusoe and the Count of Monte Cristo,
irresistibly attractive to boys." Lopez v. Capital Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 60, 65-66, 296
P.2d 63, 65 (1956): "The applicability of the doctrine involves the element of lure to
children." Doyle v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 6 Cal. 2d 550, 553, 59 P.2d 93, 94 (1936):
"From his seat, he did not see any part of the apparatus connected with the injury which
he later suffered . . . there is no evidence tending to prove that by means of any attrac-
tive nuisance or other invitation the plaintiff was by the defendants drawn into the
commission of any act which led to the accident and injury." See also references to the
importance of allurement or "implied invitation" in Bradley v. Thompson, 65 Cal. App.
226, 223 Pac. 572 (1924) and Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. App. 742,
206 Pac. 498 (1922).
107 118 Cal. App. 2d 830, 259 P.2d 84 (1953).
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within the shack, as a lure within a lure. Reynolds v. Willson men-
tioned that the jury could find a pool partially filled with water was
"more attractive" 08 to children. The uncertain state of the California
law on this subject is also indicated by the fact that in many of the
cases in which recovery was denied, the plaintiff, in his complaint,
believed it desirable, if not absolutely necessary, to plead some specific
lure or enticement as justifying the initial trespass. In Wilford v. Little,
the pool, plus its diving board, was alleged to be a special attraction
to children. In Lake v. Ferrer, the complaint alleged a "lustrous me-
tallic" ladder, visible from plaintiff's property, as the lure that enticed
the child onto the defendant's property. King v. Lennen is replete with
references to the presence, on defendants' property, of the animals (a
cow, two dogs and three horses) which attracted children on to the
premises, as well as the visibility of the pool from the street.
However, Restatement section 339 eliminates the lure requirement.
This is clearly expressed in the comment on clause (a) as follows:
It is not necessary that the defendant should know that the con-
dition which he maintains upon his land is likely to attract the tres-
passes of children or that the children's trespasses shall be due to the
attractiveness of the condition. It is sufficient to satisfy the conditions
stated in Clause (a) that the possessor knows or should know that
children are likely to trespass upon a part of the land upon which he
maintains a condition which is likely to be dangerous to them because
of their childish propensities to intermeddle or otherwise. Therefore,
the possessor is subject to liability to children who after entering the
land are attracted into dangerous intermeddling by such a condition
maintained by him although they were ignorant of its existence until
after they had entered the land, if he knows or should know that the
place is one upon which children are likely to trespass and that the
condition is one with which they are likely to meddle.
The basic principle of this provision, conforming to what appears to
be the current majority view, has been expressed as "the element of
allurement, enticement or attraction onto the land in the first instance
is not essential, and is important only in so far as it may mean that
the trespass is to be anticipated."' 0 9
In some of the more recent cases, discussing section 339, the Cali-
fornia courts have recognized that neither lure nor implied invitation is
essential. The clearest statement of that view is in Copfer v. Golden: 01
Thus one is negligent in maintaining an agency which he knows or
reasonably should know to be dangerous to children of tender years
at a place where he knows or reasonably should know such children
10851 Cal. 2d 94, 101, 331 P.2d 48, 53 (1958).
109Pnoss~n, ToRTs 440 (2d ed. 1955).
110 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627,288 P.2d 90, 92 (1955).
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are likely to resort or to which they are likely to be attracted by the
agency, unless he exercises reasonable care to guard them against
danger which their youth and ignorance prevent them from appre-
ciating. If to the knowledge of the owner, children of tender years
habitually come on his property where a dangerous condition exists
to which they are exposed, the duty to exercise reasonable care of
their safety arises not because of an implied invitation but because
of the owner's knowledge of unconscious exposure to danger which
the children do not realize. [Emphasis added.]
It would seem, therefore, that since California has never clearly
adopted the strict lure requirement of the United Zinc case, that since
the decision in King v. Lennen expressly adopts section 339 of the
Restatement, plaintiff need plead and prove only that the presence of
trespassing children was known or foreseeable. The dangerous con-
dition, as a lure, is significant only as evidence on the issue of knowl-
edge of the likelihood of trespassing children. If there is evidence
establishing that the possessor knew that children trespassed in the
area of the dangerous condition, it is immaterial whether they were
or were not lured into committing the initial trespass by that condition.
The Scope of Liability
It must not be forgotten that the liability of the possessor is not
an absolute liability, but is rooted in negligence, and therefore will
depend upon a weighing of the three factors of the social utility of the
condition, the risk or hazard it poses, and the practicability of taking
adequate precautions.11' The risk factor is in turn a composite of the
probability of harm and the seriousness of such harm as may result.
These factors become of major importance when considering the po-
tential liability of property owners maintaining "back-yard" swimming
pools.
The utility of such conditions, important as they may be as a matter
of social status, is not likely to be highly regarded, when compared
with such conditions as railroad turntables, power lines, sand and
gravel pits, farm and other machinery, which have, in the past, been
regarded as within the attractive nuisance doctrine. It cannot be
denied that such pools create a probable risk of serious harm to tres-
passing children too young to appreciate the danger. It would seem
therefore that the decision in any pool case, in the future, will de-
pend almost entirely upon two factual questions: whether it was lo-
cated in an area in which young children were likely to intrude, and
whether the possessor took reasonable precautions to prevent intrusion
M1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934); Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF.
L. REV. 427, 466-69 (1959).
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or make the premises safe. Obviously, the possessor cannot be required
to make his premises secure against any and all child trespassers, but
it would seem that the possessor of property with a pool in his yard,
in a residential neighborhood, is now under a duty adequately to fence
or otherwise safeguard his property in such a manner that children
too young to appreciate the hazards of the pool will also be too young
to scale the fence, manipulate the gates, or get by the safeguards. If
the possessor can afford the luxury of the pool, he will have to afford
the added expense of such safeguards.
